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1 Introduction
We provide new solutions to the river claims problem, using Composition axioms. These
axioms are adapted from the literature on claims problems to the case of river sharing,
where they have particularly relevant interpretations in the context of variable and
uncertain river flow. Our analysis adds to the emerging literature on axiomatic ap-
proaches to river sharing (cf. Béal et al., 2013), which has two interesting features. The
first is its close ties to other allocation problems with constraints on the relation be-
tween agents. Examples include hierarchies or networks (Demange, 2004; I˙lkılıç, 2011)
and multi-period or intergenerational sharing (Arrow et al., 2004). The second feature
is that the axiomatic approach can be easily put to use in negotiations on river shar-
ing because the axioms can generally be interpreted as describing characteristics of a
negotiation procedure. Such procedures can be implemented by the negotiating parties
themselves, by the members of a joint river basin committee, or perhaps even by an
intervening third party when conflict over water occurs (Ansink and Weikard, 2009).
Recent axiomatic studies (cf. Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Ambec and Ehlers, 2008;
Khmelnitskaya, 2010; Van den Brink et al., 2012; Béal et al., 2012) model river sharing
as a cooperative game, where the axioms are imposed on the distribution of welfare
to the agents. Van den Brink et al. (2013) argue that, instead, the axioms should be
imposed directly on the allocation of welfare derived from water use, which allows a
closer link between the axioms and actual water allocation. In this paper, we take this
argument one step further and we impose axioms directly on the allocation of water. In
doing so, we ignore the agents’ benefit functions, which avoids some difficulties in im-
plementing cooperative solutions for water allocation, identified by Dinar et al. (1992).
The disadvantage of our direct approach is that we cannot assess solutions in terms
of economic (Kaldor-Hicks) efficiency. The important advantage, however, is that it is
far more realistic (cf. Dinar and Nigatu, 2013). In the vast majority of reported negoti-
ations on river sharing, the subject of negotiation is the allocation of physical units of
water, rather than the benefits derived from water use (Beach et al., 2000). As stated by
Wolf (1999, page 12): “In practice, economic criteria have influenced water allocations
only in the exception”. Furthermore, once conflicts over water are settled and property
rights are mutually acknowledged, agents can decide to engage in water trade if there
are unexploited welfare gains (although Ansink et al. (2012) find that the opportunities
for such trade may be restricted if there are four or more agents).
Extending Ansink and Weikard (2012) to allow for settings without water scarcity,
we model river sharing as a river claims problem. In such problems, agents are ordered
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linearly and each agent has both an initial water endowment and a claim to the re-
source. River claims problems add a linear structure to the well-known claims problem
introduced by O’Neill (1982). Two differences are that in the claims problem, the agents
are not ordered and that there is just one resource to be allocated to the agents (for an
extensive overview of this literature, see Thomson, 2003). The three ‘ingredients’ of
a river claims problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉 are easily derived. The ordered set of agents N
is given by the countries located along the river from source to mouth. The vector of
water endowments e is given by inflow to the river from rainfall or tributaries. The
vector of agents’ claims c is put forward by the agents themselves in negotiations over
river water (cf. McCaffrey, 2007; Daoudy, 2008). Claims can be based on a wide range
of river sharing principles, ranging from legal principles—such as the 1966 Helsinki
Rules or the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention—to principles based on historical use,
population, or irrigation needs (Wolf, 1999; Van der Zaag et al., 2002).
We propose solutions to the river claims problem based on Composition axioms, in-
troduced by Moulin (1987) and Young (1988). These axioms pertain to the possibility
that after its initial allocation, the available amount of the resource turns out to be
different from what was expected. We derive four Composition axioms tailored to the
setting of river sharing, using two different interpretations. One interpretation is based
on variable and uncertain river flow. The other interpretation is based on a possible ne-
gotiation procedure in which upstream water is allocated before downstream water, or
vice versa. We find that only one rule satisfies all four Composition axioms. This is
the sharing rule induced by the Harmon Doctrine, which says that countries are free
to use any water available on their territory, without concern for downstream impacts.
We provide two characterizations of this rule based on the Composition axioms. We
also show the relation of the Harmon rule to both the class of sequential sharing rules
(Ansink and Weikard, 2012) and the class of Priority rules (Moulin, 2000; Thomson,
2013).
In a next step we shortly assess the ‘No-harm’ rule, which says that countries should
care about downstream impacts, and therefore, water is allocated as far downstream as
possible. The No-harm rule satisfies only two out of four Composition axioms. We adapt
two of our results for the Harmon rule to the No-harm rule and discuss the relevance of
doing so.
In the next section we introduce the river claims problem. In Section 3 we introduce
and motivate our Composition axioms and we describe their relevance for river sharing.
In Section 4 we present our characterization results and in Section 5 we conclude.
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2 Background
In this section we first briefly introduce the river claims problem based on Ansink and
Weikard (2012). We generalize their analysis by dropping an assumption on water
scarcity, as explained below. Subsequently we describe the class of sequential sharing
rules that solve the river claims problem.
2.1 The river claims problem extended
Consider an ordered set N = (1,2, . . . ,n) of agents located along a river, with agent i
upstream of j whenever i < j. Ui = { j ∈N : j < i} is the set of agents upstream of i, and
D i = { j ∈ N : j > i} is the set of agents downstream of i. On i’s territory, total river flow
increases by e i ≥ 0 because of e.g. rainfall. We write e = (e1, . . . , en) and refer to this
inflow as ‘endowments’. Downstream water availability depends on upstream water
allocation. Let the amount of available water on the territory of agent i be denoted by
E i ≡ e i+∑ j∈Ui (e j− x j), where x= (x1, . . . , xn) is the water allocation vector as described
below. E i equals endowments plus run-off of unused upstream water. Each agent has
an exogenous claim ci ≥ 0 to total river flow. We write c= (c1, . . . , cn).
We can now define the river claims problem, which concerns the allocation of water
among the agents based on their claims.
Definition 1 (River claims problem). A river claims problem is a triple ω = 〈N, e, c〉,
with N an ordered and finite set of agents, an endowments vector e ∈ Rn+ and a claims
vector c ∈Rn+.
Remark 1. Unlike Ansink and Weikard (2012) but consistent with e.g. Chun (1988)
and Herrero et al. (1999), for the domain of general allocation problems, we do not im-
pose water scarcity throughout the river but, instead, allow for abundance.1 The main
argument for this generalization of the domain of river claims problems is their spatial
and temporal setting. We illustrate both arguments using a simple example. Consider
the river sharing problem ω = 〈N, e = (1,1,4), c = (1,3,3)〉. The ‘spatial’ argument is
that, since water flows downstream, there is scarcity upstream because agent 2 cannot
satisfy his full claim with the available water of agents 1 and 2 (e1+ e2 = 2 < 3 = c2).
Despite this upstream scarcity, there is no scarcity downstream, due to the large en-
dowment of agent 3, which exceeds his claim (e3 = 4> 3= c3). The uni-directionality of
1Specifically, Ansink and Weikard (2012) assume that downstream claims exceed downstream endow-
ments at each location along the river: ci+∑ j∈D i c j ≥ e i+∑ j∈D i e j ∀i ∈N.
4
river flow creates local scarcity, that cannot be mitigated by downstream abundance.2
The ‘temporal’ argument is that some of the axioms that we employ in this paper would
not apply when imposing water scarcity. One of these axioms is River Composition, an
invariance property that refers to situations where additional water arrives after the
initially available river flow has been allocated. In the example, suppose that the ini-
tial endowment vector equals e1 = (1,1,1) which is allocated according to some rule, for
example by assigning it all to the downstream agent 3. Now, when the remaining water
e2 = (0,0,3) arrives, we have a problem where agent 3 is satisfied, but the remaining
three units of water cannot be allocated to agent 1 or 2, due to the uni-directionality of
river flow. If we would impose water scarcity, River Composition would not be applica-
ble to this example, although the situation is very relevant in practice. Following our
choice not to assume scarcity, we do impose that water can be freely disposed of.
Denote by Ω the set of river claims problems. We now define a sharing rule for such
problems.
Definition 2 (Sharing rule). A sharing rule is a mapping F : Ω→ Rn that assigns to
every river claims problem ω ∈Ω a water allocation vector x = (x1, . . . , xn), x ∈ Rn+, such
that
(a) 0≤ xi ≤ ci ∀i ∈N, (claims-boundedness)
(b) xi ≤E i ∀i ∈N, (feasibility)
(c)
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N e i−max
{
0,
∑n
k= j(ek− ck) : j ∈N
}
. (minimum waste)
The allocation of water to agent i is Fi(ω) = xi. Requirements (a)–(c) impose non-
negativity, claims-boundedness, feasibility, and minimum waste. This last requirement
(c) requires additional explanation. Because we allow for the possibility of water abun-
dance we cannot simply impose
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N e i. Instead, we correct the sum of allo-
cated water by subtracting excess water which, if present, occurs in the downstream
part of the river and is calculated by the largest
∑n
k= j(ek− ck). For the example in Re-
mark 1, requirement (c) imposes that
∑
i∈N xi = 1+1+4−max{0,6−7,5−6,4−3} = 5
units of water are allocated, while 1 excess unit of water is freely disposed.
2One argument to assume water scarcity throughout the river is that ‘non-scarce’ problems can easily
be transformed into ‘scarce’ problems, simply by removing the most downstream agents that do not face
water scarcity. In the example, this would imply that agent 3 is removed to obtain ω′ = 〈N, e = (1,1), c =
(1,3)
〉
.
5
2.2 Sequential sharing rules
Having defined the river claims problem, one approach to solve it is by applying a
sequential sharing rule. We adapt the construction and definition of such rules by
Ansink and Weikard (2012) to allow for the possibility of water abundance. Denote by
cD i ≡ max
{
0,
∑ j
k=i+1(ck− ek) : j ∈D i
}
the downstream excess claim: the sum of claims
that cannot be satisfied with downstream water, by all agents downstream of i. The
max operator prevents negative values of the downstream excess claim. Such val-
ues could occur in absence of scarcity, as in the example in Remark 1 where we have
cD2 =max {0,3−4}= 0.
Using this definition of the downstream excess claim, a river claims problem ω
can be interpreted as a sequence (ω1, . . . ,ωn) of reduced river claims problems ωi =〈
{i,D i},min
{
E i, ci+ cD i
}
, (ci, cD i )
〉
, with two agents i and D i, a claims vector (ci, cD i ),
and available water min
{
E i, ci+ cD i
}
. Applying free disposal of excess water, the min
operator prevents the volume of water for allocation to exceed the sum of claims. A re-
duced river claims problem is mathematically equivalent to the two-agent version of
a standard claims problem ψ = 〈N,E, c〉 so that standard rules (e.g. proportional rule,
constrained equal awards rule) can be applied to any such problem.
Definition 3 (Sequential sharing rule). A sequential sharing rule for river claims prob-
lem ω is a sharing rule F that allocates to each agent the allocation provided by repeat-
edly applying a rule B to its corresponding sequence of reduced river claims problems
(ω1, . . . ,ωn), so that Fi(ω)=Bi(ωi) ∀i ∈N.3
The class of sequential sharing rules is characterized by three axioms: Only n’s Ex-
cess Claim Matters, No Advantageous Downstream Merging, and Upstream Consistency
(Ansink and Weikard, 2012, Proposition 1), which will be used in Section 4. Note that
the construction of c′n in Only n’s Excess Claim Matters as well as the construction of
e′n−1 in No Advantageous Downstream Merging is adapted to allow for the possibility of
water abundance.
Axiom 1 (Only n’s Excess Claim Matters). For each river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉,
and each related problemω′ = 〈N, e′, c′〉 such that e′ = (e1, . . . , en−1, e′n) and c′ = (c1, . . . , cn−1, c′n)
with e′n = 0 and c′n =max(0, cn− en), we have Fi(ω)= Fi(ω′) for all i ∈N \ n.
Axiom 2 (No Advantageous Downstream Merging). For each river claims problem
ω = 〈N, e, c〉, and each related problem ω′ = 〈N ′, e′, c′〉 such that N ′ = N \ {n} and e′ =
3The definition of this class of rules shows similarities with the procedure used by Moreno-Ternero
(2011) to characterize a class of rules inspired by the Talmud.
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(e1, . . . , en−2, e′n−1) and c
′ = (c1, . . . , cn−2, c′n−1), with e′n−1 = en−1+min(cn, en) and c′n−1 =
cn−1+ cn, we have Fi(ω)= Fi(ω′) for all i < n−1.
Axiom 3 (Upstream Consistency). For each river claims problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉, each
i ∈N\{1}, and each related problem ω′ = 〈N ′, e′, c′〉 such that N ′ =N\{1}, c′ = (c2, . . . , cn),
and e′ = (e1− x1+ e2, e3, . . . , en), we have Fi(ω′)= Fi(ω) for all i ∈N \1.
3 Composition axioms
As discussed in the Introduction, we apply two Composition axioms, introduced by
Moulin (1987) and Young (1988), to the river sharing problem. Composition, also known
as Lower Composition or Composition Up, is an invariance property that relates to the
unexpected arrival of additional resources after the initial resource has been allocated.
Its dual property is Path Independence, also known as Upper Composition or Composi-
tion Down, which relates to an unexpected drop in the available resource after it has
been allocated. Both axioms are particularly appealing for the case of river water shar-
ing, as we demonstrate below.
In the following definitions of axioms, note that for two water endowment vectors e
and e′, we write e > e′ if and only if e i ≥ e′i ∀i ∈N with strict inequality for at least one
agent.
Axiom 4 (River Composition). For each river claims problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉 and each
e′ < e which gives the two related problems ω′ = 〈N, e′, c〉 and ω′′ = 〈N, e− e′, c−F(ω′)〉,
we have F(ω)= F(ω′)+F(ω′′).4
Suppose that additional water arrives in the river after the initially available river
flow has been allocated. River Composition requires that in such cases there is no
difference between (i) canceling the initial allocation and reapplying the same rule to
the situation with more river water; and (ii) letting agents keep their initial allocation,
reducing their claims accordingly, and applying the same rule to the additional water
(Moulin, 2000; Thomson, 2003).
Related to River Composition is River Path Independence.
4In the definitions by Moulin (2000) and Thomson (2003), two additional requirements are that the
sum of claims exceeds the resource and that resource endowments are non-negative. In our model we
allow for problems where the sum of claims does not exceed the resource, as motivated in Section 2.1.
Non-negativity of endowments follows from our definition of the river claims problem in Definition 1,
which also replaces the endowment parameter by an endowment vector, consistent with the difference
between claims- and river claims problems.
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Axiom 5 (River Path Independence). For each river claims problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉 and
each e′ > e which gives the two related problems ω′ = 〈N, e′, c〉 and ω′′ = 〈N, e,F(ω′)〉,
we have F(ω)= F(ω′′).
Suppose that there is less river flow than expected so that the initial allocation of
river water is infeasible. River Path Independence requires that in such cases there is
no difference between (i) canceling the initial allocation and applying the same rule to
the situation with less river water; and (ii) considering the initial allocation as claims
on the revised water volume and applying the same rule to this new problem (Moulin,
2000; Thomson, 2003).
The River Composition and River Path Independence axioms are particularly ap-
pealing for the case of river water sharing, because of three hydrological characteristics
of river flow. First, river flow is not constant; it typically displays inter-annual and sea-
sonal variability as well as daily variation (Dettinger and Diaz, 2000; Ward et al., 2010).
The variability of river flow depends on inter alia the climatological and morphological
conditions of the river basin. For example, snow-dominated river basins in a temperate
climate will display different run-off regimes than rain-fed rivers in an arid climate. As
a result, the decision to apply a sharing rule to the volume of annual river flow is ad
hoc and may bias the outcome (e.g. when such annual sharing gives a different outcome
than the sum of allocations of monthly sharing). Second, river flow is uncertain despite
advanced forecasting methods (Krzysztofowicz, 2001; Montanari and Grossi, 2008). An
agreed upon sharing rule at the start of the year may have unforeseen consequences
if the realized volume of river flow deviates from the expected volume. Given hydro-
logical uncertainties and imperfect forecasting methods, such deviations are hard to
avoid. Third, this line of reasoning can be extended to encompass the potential effects
of climate change on river flow and the hydrological cycle in general. In addition to
increases in run-off variability and the frequency of extreme events, climate change in-
duces changes in the mean run-off for many river basins (Milly et al., 2005; Bates et al.,
2008). Such permanent changes in water availability may require rationing of water
allocations (Olmstead, 2010), which is straightforward if allocation is based on a rule
that satisfies River Composition, River Path Independence or, preferably, both.
As we will see in Section 4, River Composition turns out to be a very strong property.
Perhaps too strong for practical use. This is one reason to study weaker versions of
this axiom. A second reason is that such weaker versions are applicable when we give
these axioms a slightly different interpretation, as follows. Suppose that the set of
agents N meets to negotiate a solution to the river claims problem. One attractive way
of approaching the problem is to first agree on the allocation of e1, then e2, e3, and so
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on, following the direction of the river downstream. The dual approach follows the same
procedure in opposite direction. This interpretation of River Composition as reflecting
a negotiation procedure is captured in the following two axioms.
Axiom 6 (Composition Downstream). For each river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉, each
i ∈N and each e′ = (e1, . . . , e i,0, . . . ,0) which gives the two related problems ω′ =
〈
N, e′, c
〉
and ω′′ = 〈N, e− e′, c−F(ω′)〉, we have F(ω)= F(ω′)+F(ω′′).
Axiom 7 (Composition Upstream). For each river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉, each i ∈
N and each e′ = (0, . . . ,0, e i+1, . . . , en) which gives the two related problems ω′ =
〈
N, e′, c
〉
and ω′′ = 〈N, e− e′, c−F(ω′)〉, we have F(ω)= F(ω′)+F(ω′′).
Finally, for the characterization results in the next section, we need an additional
axiom, which has a very straightforward interpretation in the river setting.
Axiom 8 (No Contribution Property). For each river claims problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉 and
for each i ∈N \1, if e i = 0 then Fi(ω)≤min
{
ci,max{E i−1− ci−1,0}
}
.
The No Contribution Property states that if some agent has no water endowment,
his upstream neighbor need not share any water that he can use to satisfy his own
claim. In other words, if an agent does not contribute any inflow, then his allocation
is secondary to his upstream neighbor’s allocation. This axiom is related to the No
Contribution Property on the domain of river sharing problems with transferable utility
(Van den Brink et al., 2011).
4 Characterization results
We now proceed to the characterization results, which are summarized in Table 1. We
start with the Harmon rule and then proceed with the No-harm rule.
4.1 The Harmon rule
The Harmon rule implements the Harmon Doctrine in river claims problems, and is
largely favorable to upstream riparians. The Harmon Doctrine refers to the principle
issued in 1895 by US Attorney General Judson Harmon that countries are free to use
any water available on their territory, without concern for downstream impacts (Mc-
Caffrey, 2007). This doctrine has been widely disputed and is currently not recognized
in international water law. In fact, international water law such as the 1966 Helsinki
Rules and the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, is based primarily on the principles
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of “reasonable and equitable utilization” and “no significant harm to other riparians”,
which stand in sharp contrast to the Harmon Doctrine (Salman, 2007). Nevertheless,
the Harmon Doctrine (or equivalently, the principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty)
is often raised by upstream riparians during water disputes (Wolf, 1999).
Definition 4 (Harmon rule). The Harmon rule for a river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉
allocates water such that Fi(ω)=min{E i, ci} for all i ∈N.
An implication of the Harmon rule is that agents need not consider downstream
claims in their water use decisions. Note that Van den Brink et al. (2013) study the
same rule under a different name and using slightly different notation that highlights
the recursive structure of allocating river water where availability depends on up-
stream use. We further discuss this paper at the end of this sub-section.
In Lemma 1 we show that the Harmon rule satisfies all four Composition axioms.
Proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Lemma 1. The Harmon rule satisfies River Composition, Composition Downstream,
Composition Upstream, and River Path Independence.
We now turn to our characterization results. Despite its simple appeal and rea-
sonable interpretation Composition Downstream characterizes the Harmon rule, which
has been considered an extreme solution.
Proposition 1. A solution on the class of river claims problems is equal to the Harmon
rule if and only if it satisfies Composition Downstream.
At first glance a characterization result based on a single axiom seems to be weak,
but see Thomson (2001, Section 4.4) who dismisses such criticism as a ‘counting prob-
lem’ only. On a related note, several properties of the Harmon rule, such as feasibility
and the minimum waste condition, are not explicitly modeled as axioms. Instead, they
enter the analysis as requirements in the definition of a sharing rule, see Definition 2.
An alternative characterization of the Harmon rule is obtained using River Path
Independence:
Proposition 2. A solution on the class of river claims problems is equal to the Harmon
rule if and only if it satisfies River Path Independence and the No Contribution Property.
For the case where e = (e1,0, . . . ,0), the Harmon rule coincides with an extreme ex-
ample from the class of Priority rules for claims problems due to Moulin (2000). The
extreme example occurs when the set of agents is partitioned in priority classes such
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that each agent is in a different priority class. Then, the claims problem resembles
a river claims problem, where upstream agents may be interpreted to have priority
over downstream agents. The Priority rule says that the non-prioritized agent receives
resources only if the claim of the prioritized agent has been fully met.
Definition 5 (Priority rule). The Priority rule for a claims problem with ordered agents
ψ= 〈N,E, c〉 allocates water such that ∀i, j ∈N with i < j, if B j(ψ)> 0, then Bi(ψ)= ci.
Generalizing to river claims problems—which are not constrained to the endowment
vector e = (e1,0, . . . ,0) but may feature any endowment vector e—the Priority rule can
be used to characterize the Harmon rule as a sequential sharing rule. To see how, note
that the Harmon rule can be interpreted as a sequential sharing rule, in which for each
reduced river claims problem ωi, the rule assigns min{E i, ci} to i and any remaining
water to D i. Using Definition 3, the sequential sharing rule based on the Priority rule
for river claims problem ω, is the sharing rule F that allocates to each agent the alloca-
tion provided by repeatedly applying the Priority rule B to its corresponding sequence
of reduced river claims problems (ω1, . . . ,ωn), so that Fi(ω)=Bi(ωi) ∀i ∈N.
Proposition 3. On the class of river claims problems, the Harmon rule coincides with
the sequential sharing rule based on the Priority rule.
Combining Propositions 1 and 3, and given that the Harmon rule falls within the
class of sequential sharing rules, we know that Composition Downstream implies all
three characterizing axioms of these rules: Only n’s Excess Claim Matters, No Advan-
tageous Downstream Merging, and Upstream Consistency. Nevertheless, none of the
sequential sharing rules assessed by Ansink and Weikard (2012) (i.e. those based on
the proportional rule, constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and the Tal-
mud rule) satisfies Composition Downstream. Apparently, despite its simple appeal and
reasonable interpretation, Composition Downstream is a very powerful property.
For completeness, we provide a second characterization of the Harmon rule, using
the insight provided by Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. A solution on the class of river claims problems is equal to the Harmon
rule if and only if it satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim Matters, No Advantageous Down-
stream Merging, Upstream Consistency, and the No Contribution Property.
Finally, and closing our analysis of the Harmon rule, it is insightful to relate our
results to recent work by Van den Brink et al. (2013, Section 6), where they assess how
some sharing rules for river sharing problems with transferable utility can be applied
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on the domain of river claims problems. Their approach is to assume that every agent
has constant marginal benefits of water use up to a satiation point, and zero marginal
benefits thereafter. These satiation points are then interpreted as the agents’ claims.
It turns out that on the domain of river claims problems and using this approach, the
downstream incremental solution, originally proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002),
coincides with the Harmon rule.
This coincidence is quite surprising, given the emphasis that this rule puts on as-
signment of benefits to downstream agents on its original domain of river sharing prob-
lems (Van den Brink et al., 2007; Houba, 2008). The explanation for this coincidence is
that the downstream incremental solution takes the Harmon doctrine as the basis for
defining lower bounds on welfare for each (coalition of) agent(s) and then formulates an
aspiration welfare level for each (coalition of) agent(s). Because there are no monetary
transfers in a claims problem (or, using the above interpretation, because marginal
benefits of water use are constant), the aspiration welfare does not exceed the lower
bounds. Therefore, the downstream incremental solution implements the Harmon doc-
trine, which leads to the Harmon rule for river claims problems.
Note that Van den Brink et al. (2013) characterize the Harmon rule using three
basic axioms and Independence of Downstream Claims, a property that, as suggested
by its name, implies that upstream allocation is independent of the size of downstream
claims. In contrast to Composition Downstream, we argue that this is not a desirable
property of solutions to a river claims problem, which clearly demonstrates the two
faces of the Harmon rule.
4.2 The No-harm rule
The No-harm rule is similar in spirit to the Harmon rule, by allocating water based
on principles from international water law. The No-harm rule implements an extreme
interpretation of the principle of doing “no significant harm to other riparians”, and is
largely favourable to downstream riparians. Joint with the principle of “reasonable and
equitable utilization”, it forms the basis of international water law, introduced by the
1966 Helsinki Rules, and incorporated by the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. We
interpret the principle in its extreme form, where it coincides with the notion of Unlim-
ited Territorial Integrity (Salman, 2007). In this interpretation, the principle requires
that no harm is done at all. This implies that water is allocated as far downstream as
possible, given the claims-boundedness requirement of sharing rules in Definition 2.
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Definition 6 (No-harm rule). The No-harm rule for a river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉
allocates water such that Fi(ω)=max
{
0,E i− cD i
}
for all i ∈N.
An implication of the No-harm rule is that agents only consider downstream claims
in their water use decisions. Similar to the Harmon rule, Van den Brink et al. (2013,
Section 6) study the No-harm rule under a different name and using slightly different
notation that highlights the recursive structure of allocating river water.
The following results are related to those in Section 4.1. In Lemma 1 we show that
the No-harm rule satisfies only two out of four Composition axioms.
Lemma 2 (see Lemma 1). The No-harm rule satisfies Composition Upstream and River
Path Independence, but not River Composition nor Composition Downstream.
By taking the inverse of both the Priority rule and the No Contribution Property,
Propositions 3 and 4 as applied to the Harmon rule, can be applied to the No-harm rule.
Definition 7 (Reverse Priority rule). The Reverse Priority rule for a claims problem
with ordered agents ψ = 〈N,E, c〉 allocates water such that ∀i, j ∈ N with i < j, if
Bi(ψ)> 0, then B j(ψ)= c j.
Axiom 9 (Full Contribution Property). For each river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉 and
for each i ∈N \1, if e i = 0 then Fi(ω)≥min
{
ci,E i−1
}
.
Compared to the Priority rule in Definition 5, the Reverse Priority rule just reverses
the order of the agents. The rule states that, when downstream agents have priority
over upstream agents, the upstream agent receives resources only if the claim of the
downstream agents have been fully met. The Reverse No Contribution Property states
that if some agent has no water endowment, his upstream neighbor should provide any
available water needed to satisfy the unendowed agent’s claim.
Proposition 5 (see Proposition 3). On the class of river claims problems, the No-harm
rule coincides with the sequential sharing rule based on the Reverse Priority rule.
Proposition 6 (see Proposition 4). A solution on the class of river claims problems is
equal to the No-harm rule if and only if it satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim Matters, No
Advantageous Downstream Merging, Upstream Consistency, and the Full Contribution
Property.
The proofs of both propositions follow immediately from the proofs of Propositions 3
and 4 when replacing, respectively, the Priority rule and the No Contribution Property
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Table 1: Axioms satisfied by the Harmon and No-harm rules. Arrows denote implica-
tion. Equal symbols in one column indicate a characterization.
axioms \ rules Harmon No-harm
River Path Independence yes ¶ yes
River Composition yes no
⇒ Composition Downstream yes † no
⇒ Composition Upstream yes yes
Only n’s Excess Claim Matters yes § yes ?
No Advantageous Downstream Merging yes § yes ?
Upstream Consistency yes § yes ?
No Contribution Property yes §¶ no
Full Contribution Property no yes ?
by their inverse. To some extent, the Reverse Priority rule and the Full Contribution
Property lack the appeal of their regular counterparts in Definition 5 and Axiom 8. The
main purpose of Propositions 5 and 6 is therefore to show the relation between the
Harmon and No-harm rules rather than to show their standalone contribution.
Similar to the Harmon rule, Van den Brink et al. (2013) have also assessed the No-
harm rule. On the domain of river claims problems, the No-harm rule coincides with
the UTI incremental solution, where UTI refers to the principle of Unlimited Territo-
rial Integrity, discussed above. They characterize the No-harm rule using three basic
axioms and Independence of Upstream Claims, with an interpretation analogue to the
characterization discussed in the previous sub-section on the Harmon rule.
5 Conclusion
Variability is a key characteristic of river flow, and constitutes the basis of uncertainty
over expected water availability. The impacts of climate change on the hydrological cy-
cle are, in many river basins, amplifying natural levels of variability. When drafting
sharing rules for river water, efficiency and stability can be enhanced by taking into ac-
count such variability (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008; Ambec et al., 2013; Ansink and Houba,
2013) The applicability and desirability of the Composition axioms is evident for such
rules. In our paper, the linear order provides a rigid structure to the river claims prob-
lem so that these axioms (e.g. River Composition), which are not particularly strong
for claims problems (Thomson, 2003), turn out to be very strong properties in the river
setting.
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Our main results are that the Harmon rule is (i) the only rule that satisfies Compo-
sition Downstream, (ii) the only rule that satisfies River Path Independence and the No
Contribution Property, and (iii) the only rule that satisfy all four Composition axioms.
These strong results complement the recent literature that proposes to make sharing
rules contingent on river flow (cf. Kilgour and Dinar, 2001; De Stefano et al., 2012). Our
paper shows that even contingent rules such as proportional sharing are inferior to
the Harmon rule in the context of variable river flow as formalized in the Composition
axioms. This is surprising since the main argument for contingent or flexible sharing
rules is that they perform well under variability.
The reason why such sharing rules are inferior to the Harmon rule is that many
sharing rules are based on the annual sharing of available water. Composition proper-
ties, however, deal with unexpected changes in the availability of water at any time of
the year. An attractive alternative to annual sharing is therefore to share the available
water based on shorter time-spans. Some river sharing treaties are already based on
monthly or even weekly sharing of available water (Beach et al., 2000), thereby mitigat-
ing (or eliminating) any unexpected variability, which actually disables the Composition
properties assessed in this paper. An interesting example is the Ganges treaty between
India and Bangladesh. This treaty specifies a sharing rule applied to 10-day intervals in
the January 1 to May 31 dry period, contingent on river flow and based on the amount
of water passing the Farakka barrage, close to the two countries’ border (Tanzeema and
Faisal, 2001).
Finally, the Harmon rule is a controversial sharing rule and our paper should not
be interpreted as an ignorant pledge to implement this rule. Instead, this paper should
be seen in a broader line of research that aims to show the trade-offs made in choosing
particular water sharing rules, using the tools of axiomatic analysis. In the current
paper, we achieve this aim by focusing on variability and uncertainty of river flow and
we argue that, in this context, the Harmon rule has several attractive features that
were unknown, and hence unappreciated, up till now.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let F be the Harmon rule such that Fi(ω)=min {E i, ci} for all i ∈N, and consider
a river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉. We prove the lemma for each axiom separately.
River Composition Consider e′ < e such that we have the two related problems ω′ =〈
N, e′, c
〉
and ω′′ = 〈N, e− e′, c−F(ω′)〉. Start upstream with agent i = 1. Note that we
have E1 = e1 and E′1 = e′1 ≤ e1 so that E′1 ≤E1.
Fi(ω)=min {E i, ci}
=min{E i−E′i+E′i, ci}
=min{E i−E′i+min{E′i, ci} , ci}
=min{E i−E′i+min{E′i, ci} , ci−min{E′i, ci}+min{E′i, ci}}
=min{E′i, ci}+min{E i−E′i, ci−min{E′i, ci}}
= Fi(ω′)+Fi(ω′′).
Repeat this step sequentially for the next downstream agents i = 2 . . .n, keeping in mind
that whenever Fi(ω) = Fi(ω′)+Fi(ω′′) we have E′i ≤ E i because e′ < e. This repeated
argument results in Fi(ω)= Fi(ω′)+Fi(ω′′) for all i ∈N; the Harmon rule satisfies River
Composition.
Composition Downstream Because the Harmon rule satisfies River Composition,
it also satisfies the weaker Composition Downstream.
Composition Upstream Because the Harmon rule satisfies River Composition, it
also satisfies the weaker Composition Upstream.
River Path Independence We proceed in two steps.
1. Consider the related problem ω′ = 〈N, e′, c〉 with e′ > e. Start upstream with
agent i = 1. Note that we have E1 = e1 and E′1 = e′1 ≥ e1 so that E′1 ≥ E1. There
are three possibilities.
(a) If E′i =E i then F ′i(ω)= Fi(ω).
(b) If E′i > E i and Fi(ω) = min {E i, ci} = ci, then, by claims-boundedness, ad-
ditional water is not used by agent i so that Fi(ω′) = min
{
E′i, ci
} = ci =
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Fi(ω). Excess water E′i −Fi(ω′) = E′i −Fi(ω) ≥ E i −Fi(ω) runs downstream
to agent i+1.
(c) If E′i >E i and Fi(ω)=min {E i, ci}=E i, then agent i will use additional water
up to his claim so that Fi(ω′)=min
{
E′i, ci
}> Fi(ω). Excess water E′i−Fi(ω′)≥
E i−Fi(ω), if any, runs downstream to agent i+1.
Repeat this step sequentially for the next downstream agents i = 2 . . .n, keeping
in mind that because E′i−Fi(ω′)≥E i−Fi(ω) and e′ > e, we have E′i+1 ≥E i+1. This
repeated argument results in Fi(ω′)≥ Fi(ω) for all i ∈N.
2. Now, consider the related problem ω′′ = 〈N, e,F(ω′)〉. Start upstream with agent
i = 1. There are two possibilities.
(a) If Fi(ω)=min {E i, ci}= ci, then by claims boundedness and Fi(ω′)≥ Fi(ω) for
all i ∈ N (the result of Step 1), we have Fi(ω′) = ci and therefore Fi(ω′′) =
min
{
E i,Fi(ω′)
}= ci = Fi(ω).
(b) If Fi(ω) =min {E i, ci} = E i, then by Fi(ω′) ≥ Fi(ω) for all i ∈ N (the result of
Step 1), we have Fi(ω′) > E i and therefore Fi(ω′′) = min
{
E i,Fi(ω′)
} = E i =
Fi(ω).
Repeat this step sequentially for the next downstream agents i = 2 . . .n. This
repeated argument results in F(ω)= F(ω′′); the Harmon rule satisfies River Path
Independence.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By Lemma 1, the Harmon rule satisfies Composition Downstream. Therefore it
is sufficient to prove that this axiom implies a unique solution, equal to the Harmon
rule. Let F be a sharing rule that satisfies Composition Downstream. Consider a river
claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉 and agents i, j ∈N, with i < j. We proceed in two steps.
1. Take e′ = (e1, . . . , e j,0, . . . ,0) and consider the two related problems
ω′( j)= 〈N, (e1, . . . , e j,0, . . . ,0), c〉 and
ω′′( j)= 〈N, (0, . . . ,0, e j+1, . . . , en), c−F (ω′( j))〉 .
By the feasibility requirement of sharing rules in Definition 2, Fi
(
ω′′( j)
)= 0 for all
i ≤ j and for any j ∈N. Apply Composition Downstream to obtain Fi(ω)= Fi
(
ω′( j)
)
for all i ≤ j and for any j ∈N.
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2. Consider agent i and suppose cD i = 0, implying that downstream agents have
excess water and any water not used by agent i is disposed of. By the efficiency
requirement of sharing rules in Definition 2, we have Fi(ω) = min{E i, ci}. By
Step 1, we have the same allocation to agent i in the related problem ω′( j) for the
case where cD i > 0. Formally, Fi
(
ω′( j)
)= Fi(ω)=min{E i, ci} for any i ≤ j.
Because Step 2 holds for all agents, we obtain the Harmon rule: Fi(ω)=min{E i, ci} for
all i ∈N.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We know from Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 that the Harmon rule satisfies River
Path Independence and the No Contribution Property. It remains to be proven that if
a sharing rule F satisfies River Path Independence and the No Contribution Property,
then it is the Harmon rule. We prove the proposition by (recursive) construction in two
steps.
1. Consider problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉 and two related problems ω′ = 〈N, (e1,0, ...,0), c〉
and ω′′ = 〈N, (e1,0, ...,0),F(ω)〉. Because of claims boundedness and the No Con-
tribution Property we have F1(ω′)=min(c1, e1) and F1(ω′′)=min(F1(ω), e1). River
Path Independence requires F(ω′′) = F(ω′). Hence if c1 ≤ e1, then F1(ω) = c1 and
if e1 ≤ c1, then F1(ω) = e1; in problem ω player 1 gets what the Harmon rule
requires.
2. Next, consider problemω= 〈N, e, c〉 and two related problemsω′ = 〈N, (e1, e2,0, ...,0), c〉
and ω′′ = 〈N, (e1, e2,0, ...,0),F(ω)〉. Because of claims boundedness and the No
Contribution Property we have F2(ω′) = min(c2,E2) and F1(ω′′) = min(F2(ω),E2)
since F1(ω) =min(c1, e1) from step 1 fixes E2. River Path Independence requires
F2(ω′′)= F2(ω′). Hence if c2 ≤E2, then F2(ω)= c2 and if E2 ≤ c2, then F2(ω)=E2;
in problem ω player 2 gets what the Harmon rule requires.
This argument can be repeated for all remaining players and we obtain the Harmon
rule: Fi(ω)=min{E i, ci} for all i ∈N.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider river claims problem ω = 〈N, e, c〉 and its sequence (ω1, . . . ,ωn) of re-
duced river claims problems ωi =
〈
{i,D i},E i, (ci, cD i )
〉
. We apply F, the sequential
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sharing rule based on the Priority rule. Consider the first of these reduced problems,
ω1 =
〈
{1,D1},E1, (c1, cD1)
〉
, where E1 = e1. Applying the Priority rule B to ω1, we obtain
if c1 ≤E1 : B1(ω1)= c1 BD1(ω1)=E1− c1
if c1 >E1 : B1(ω1)=E1 BD1(ω1)= 0.
Therefore, F1(ω)=B1(ω1)=min{E1, c1}. Proceed sequentially to the next reduced prob-
lems (ω2, . . . ,ωn), and repeatedly apply the Priority rule B to ωi. We obtain for each
problem
if ci ≤E i : Bi(ω1)= ci BD i (ω1)=E i− ci
if ci >E i : Bi(ω1)=E i BD i (ω1)= 0.
Therefore, we obtain the Harmon rule: Fi(ω)=min{E i, ci} for all i ∈N.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. By Proposition 3, because the Harmon rule falls within the class of sequential
sharing rules, we know that the Harmon rule satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim Matters,
No Advantageous Downstream Merging, and Upstream Consistency. In addition, it is
straightforward to verify that the Harmon rule satisfies the No Contribution Property.
Next, we prove that any sharing rule F that satisfies the four axioms determines a
unique solution, equal to the Harmon rule. We follow the same steps as used in the
second part of the proof of Proposition 1 by Ansink and Weikard (2012). Consider river
claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉. We first show in three steps that F1(ω)=min{E1, c1}.
1. Apply No Advantageous Downstream Merging to player 1 so that we have F1(ω)=
F1
(〈{1,D1}, (e1,∑ j∈D1 e j), (c1,∑ j∈D1 c j)〉).
2. From here, apply Only n’s Excess Claim Matters repeatedly to obtain F1(ω) =
F1
(〈{1,D1}, (e1,0), (c1,∑ j∈D1(c j− e j)〉).
3. From here, apply the No Contribution Property to obtain F1(ω)=min{E1, c1}.
We now show in four steps that F2(ω)=min{E2, c2}.
1. Apply No Advantageous Downstream Merging to player 2 so that we have F2(ω)=
F2
(〈{1,2,D2}, (e1, e2,∑ j∈D2 e j), (c1,∑ j∈D2 c j)〉).
2. From here, apply Only n’s Excess Claim Matters repeatedly to obtain F2(ω) =
F2
(〈{1,2,D2}, (e1, e2,0), (c1, c2,∑ j∈D2(c j− e j)〉).
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3. From here, given that F1(ω) = min{E1, c1}, apply Upstream Consistency to ob-
tain F2(ω) = F2
(〈{2,D2}, (E2,0), (c2,∑ j∈D2(c j− e j)〉), with E2 = e1 + e2 − F1(ω) =
e2+max{0, e1− c1}.
4. From here, apply the No Contribution Property to obtain F2(ω)=min{E2, c2}.
By repeating this last sequence of four steps for agents 3, . . . ,n−1, using recursive appli-
cation of Upstream Consistency in step 2, we obtain the Harmon rule: Fi(ω)=min{E i, ci}
for all i ∈N.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let F be the No-harm rule such that Fi(ω) =max
{
0,E i− cD i
}
for all i ∈ N, and
consider a river claims problem ω= 〈N, e, c〉. We prove the lemma for each axiom sepa-
rately.
River Composition Because the No-harm rule does not satisfy Composition Down-
stream (see below), it also does not satisfy the stronger River Composition.
Composition Downstream An example suffices to show that the No-harm rule does
not satisfy Composition Downstream. Consider ω = 〈N, e, c〉 with 3 agents, e = (1,1,1),
and c = (2,2,2), and take e′ = (1,1,0). The No-harm rule gives the solutions F(ω) =
(0,1,2), F(ω′)= (0,0,2), and F(ω′′)= (0,0,0), the problem ω′′ being a river claims problem
with downstream abundance but upstream scarcity. Clearly, F(ω) = (0,1,2) 6= (0,0,2) =
F(ω′)+F(ω′′).
Composition Upstream The No-harm rule allocates water as far downstream as
possible. This implies for any problem ω that Fi(ω)> 0 only if Fi+1(ω)= ci+1. Therefore,
the solution by the No-harm rule is of the form:
F(ω)= (0, . . . ,0,F j(ω), c j+1, . . . , cn) , (1)
with 0< F j(ω)≤ c j for some j ∈N, subject to the efficiency requirement in Definition 2.
We proceed in three steps.
1. Consider the related problem ω′ = 〈N, e′, c〉 with e′ = (0, . . . ,0, e i+1, . . . , en). By (1)
we have F(ω′) = (0, . . . ,0,F j′(ω′), c j′+1, . . . , cn). Because e′ < e, we have j′ ≥ j, with
F j′(ω′)< F j(ω) in case of equality, so that Fi(ω′)≤ Fi(ω) for all i ∈N.
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2. Now, consider the related problem ω′′ = 〈N, e−e′, c−F(ω′)〉. By (1) and the result of
Step 1, we have e−e′ = (e1, . . . , e i,0, . . . ,0) and c−F(ω′)=
(
c1, . . . , c j′−1, c j′ −F j′(ω′),0, . . . ,0
)
with j′ > i. By (1) we have F(ω′′)= (0, . . . ,0,F j′′(ω′′), c j′′+1, . . . , c j′−1, c j′ −F j′(ω′),0, . . . ,0),
such that j′′ ≤ j′.
3. F(ω′)+F(ω′′)= (0, . . . ,0,F j′′(ω′′), c j′′+1, . . . , cn). Taking j′′ = j we have F(ω)= F(ω′)+
F(ω′′); the No-harm rule satisfies Composition Upstream.
River Path Independence Similar to the proof of Composition Upstream, we use
the solution by the No-harm rule as given in (1). We proceed in two steps.
1. Consider the related problem ω′ = 〈N, e′, c〉 with e′ > e. By (1) we have F(ω′) =(
0,0, . . . ,0,F j′(ω′), c j′+1, . . . , cn−1, cn
)
. Because e′ > e, we have j′ ≤ j, with F j′(ω′) >
F j(ω) in case of equality, so that Fi(ω′)≥ Fi(ω) for all i ∈N.
2. Now, consider the related problem ω′′ = 〈N, e,F(ω′)〉. By (1), for a given endow-
ment vector e, any problem with a claims vector that weakly dominates F(ω) leads
to the solution F(ω). Since F(ω′) ≥ F(ω) (the result of Step 1) and because F(ω′)
is the claims vector in problem ω′′—which has the same endowment vector e as
problem ω—we have F(ω)= F(ω′′); the No-harm rule satisfies River Path Indepen-
dence.
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